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Abstract—We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, where two camps aim to
maximize adoption of their opinions by the population. In particular, we consider the possibility of campaigning in multiple phases,
where the final opinion of a node in a phase acts as its initial biased opinion for the following phase. Using an extension of the popular
DeGroot-Friedkin model, we formulate the utility functions of the camps, and show that they involve what can be interpreted as
multiphase Katz centrality. Focusing on two phases, we analytically derive Nash equilibrium investment strategies, and the extent of
loss that a camp would incur if it acted myopically. Our simulation study affirms that nodes attributing higher weightage to initial biases
necessitate higher investment in the first phase, so as to influence these biases for the terminal phase. We then study the setting in
which a camp’s influence on a node depends on its initial bias. For single camp, we present a polynomial time algorithm for determining
an optimal way to split the budget between the two phases. For competing camps, we show the existence of Nash equilibria under
reasonable assumptions, and that they can be computed in polynomial time.
Index Terms—Social networks, opinion dynamics, elections, multiple phases, zero-sum games, Nash equilibrium, Katz centrality.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE study of opinion dynamics in a society has beenof prime importance to understand and influence the
processes and outcomes of elections, viral marketing, propa-
gation of ideas and behaviors, etc. In this paper, we consider
two competing camps who aim to maximize the adoption of
their respective opinions in a social network. In particular,
we consider a strict competition setting where the opinion
value of one camp is denoted by +1 and that of the other
camp by −1; we refer to these camps as good and bad
camps respectively. Opinion adoption by a population can
be quantified in a variety of ways based on the application;
here we consider a well-accepted way, namely, the average
or equivalently, the sum of the opinion values of the nodes
in the network [1], [2].
The average or sum of the opinion values is of rele-
vance in several applications, for example, a fund collection
scenario where the magnitude of a node’s opinion value
corresponds to the amount and the sign indicates the camp
towards which it is willing to contribute. Another example
is when nodes are agents reporting the intensity of an
event based on the information they receive individually;
this information could be influenced by the camps. Other
examples are elections and product purchases, where the
bounded opinion value of a node would translate into its
probability of voting for a particular party or purchasing a
particular product, and so the sum of opinion values would
translate into the expected number of votes or purchases in
favor of a party or product.
Social networks play a prime role in determining the
opinions of the constituent nodes, since nodes usually up-
date their opinions based on the opinions of their connec-
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tions [3], [4]. This fact is exploited by a camp who intends
to influence the opinions of these nodes in its favor. A camp
could determine nodes whose opinion values it would want
to directly influence (without the aid of social network) by
investing on them in the form of money, free products or
discounts, attention, convincing discussions, etc. Thus given
a budget constraint, the strategy of a camp comprises of how
much to invest on a given node, in presence of a competing
camp who also would invest strategically, so as to maximize
its opinion adoption.
As per the popular DeGroot-Friedkin model [5], [6],
every node holds an initial bias in opinion which could
have formed owing to the node’s fundamental views, its
experiences, past information from news and other sources,
opinion dynamics in the past, etc. This initial bias plays
an important role in determining a node’s final opinion,
and consequently the opinions of its neighbors and hence
that of its neighbors’ neighbors and so on. If nodes give
significant weightage to their biases, the camps would want
to influence these biases. This could be implemented by
campaigning in multiple phases or rounds, wherein the
opinion at the conclusion of a phase would act as the initial
biased opinion for the next phase. Such campaigning is
often used during elections and product marketing, so as to
gradually drive the opinions of nodes. With the possibility
of campaigning in multiple phases, a camp could not only
decide which nodes to invest on, but also how to split its
available budget across different phases.
2 RELATED WORK
The topic of opinion dynamics in social networks has re-
ceived significant attention in the autonomous agents and
multiagent systems community in recent times [7], [8], [9],
[10], [11], [12], [13], [14]. Several models of opinion dynam-
ics have been proposed and studied in the literature [4], [15],
some of the noteworthy models being DeGroot [16], Voter
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2[17], [18], DeGroot-Friedkin [5], [6], bounded confidence
[19], etc. In DeGroot-Friedkin model, each node updates its
opinion using a weighted convex combination of its initial
opinion and neighbors’ opinions. Our model can be viewed
as a multiphase generalization of this model, while also
accounting for the camps’ investments.
Problems relating to maximizing opinion diffusion in
social networks have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature [3], [20], [21]. A primary task in such problems is to
determine influential nodes, which has been an important
research area in the multiagent systems community [22],
[23], [24], [25], [26], [27]. Gionis, Terzi, and Tsaparas [1]
study the problem of identifying such nodes whose positive
opinions would maximize the overall positive opinion in
the network. Yildiz, Ozdaglar, and Acemoglu [28] study the
problem of optimal placement of stubborn nodes (whose
opinion values stay unchanged) in the discrete binary
opinions setting, given the location of competing stubborn
agents. The competitive setting has resulted in several game
theoretic studies [29], [30], [31], [32]. Specific to analytically
tractable models such as DeGroot, there have been studies
in the competitive setting to identify influential nodes and
the amounts to be invested on them [2], [33], [34]. Our work
extends these studies to multiple phases, that is, we aim to
determine the influential nodes in different phases and how
much they should be invested on in a given phase.
A few studies have incorporated the concept of multiple
phases. Singer [35] presents a survey of adaptive seeding
methods for influence maximization. Horel and Singer [36]
develop such methods with provable guarantees for models
such as Voter, where the influence of a set can be expressed
as the sum of the influence of its constituent nodes. Dhamal,
Prabuchandran, and Narahari [37], [38] empirically study
the problem of optimally splitting the budget between two
phases. While the primary reasoning behind using multiple
phases in these studies is adaptation of strategy based on
observations, we aim to use multiple phases for influencing
the initial biases of the nodes, which requires a very different
treatment.
To the best of our knowledge, there has not been an
analytical study on a rich model such as DeGroot-Friedkin,
for opinion dynamics in multiple phases (not even for single
camp). Following are the specific contributions of this paper:
• We formulate the multi-phase objective function under
DeGroot-Friedkin model, resulting in a zero-sum game.
• Focusing on two phases, we derive Nash equilibrium
investment strategies and the loss that a camp would
incur if it played myopic strategy instead of farsighted.
• We go deeper into the analysis when a camp’s influence
on a node depends on its initial bias, and develop a
polynomial time algorithm for determining an optimal
way to split a camp’s budget between the two phases.
• With two competing camps, we show the existence of
Nash equilibria under reasonable assumptions, and that
they can be computed in polynomial time.
3 MODEL
Given a social network, let N be the set of nodes and E be
the set of weighted directed edges. Let n = |N |, m = |E|.
The weights could hold any sign, since the influences could
be positive or negative [39]. The good camp (opinion value
of +1) aims to maximize the sum (or average) of the opinion
values of the nodes, while the bad camp (opinion value of
−1) simultaneously aims to minimize it.
3.1 Parameters
3.1.1 Initial Bias
As per DeGroot-Friedkin model, every node i holds an
initial bias in opinion prior to the opinion dynamics process;
we denote it by v0i . In the multiphase setting, this acts as
the initial bias for the first phase. We denote the opinion
value of node i at the conclusion of phase p by v(p)i . This
acts as the initial opinion or bias for phase p+ 1. Naturally,
we can denote its initial bias for phase p by v(p−1)i . So by
convention, we have v(0)i = v
0
i . We denote the weightage
that node i attributes to its initial bias by w0ii.
3.1.2 Network Effect
Let wij be the weightage attributed by node i to the opin-
ion of its connection j. Consistent with DeGroot-Friedkin
model, we assume the influence on node i owing to node
j in phase p, to be wijv
(p)
j . So the net influence owing to
all of its connections is
∑
j 6=i wijv
(p)
j . Let wii denote the
weightage attributed by node i to its own current opinion.
3.1.3 Camp Investments
The good and bad camps attempt to directly influence the
nodes so that their opinions are pulled towards being pos-
itive and negative respectively. We denote the investments
made by the good and bad camps on node i by xi and
yi respectively, and the weightage that node i attributes
to them by wig and wib. Since the influence of good camp
(opinion of +1) on node i would be an increasing function
of both xi and wig , we assume the influence to be +wigxi
for simplicity. Similarly, −wibyi is the influence of bad camp
(opinion of −1) on node i. Let kg and kb be the respective
budgets of the good and bad camps, so the camps should
invest such that
∑
i xi ≤ kg and
∑
i yi ≤ kb.
3.1.4 Matrix Forms
Let w be the matrix consisting of the weights wij for each
pair of nodes (i, j). Let v0, w0, wg, wb, x(p), y(p), v(p) be
the vectors consisting of the elements v0i , w
0
ii, wig , wib, x
(p)
i ,
y
(p)
i , v
(p)
i , respectively. Let the operation ◦ denote Hadamard
product of vectors, that is, (a ◦ b)i = aibi.
3.1.5 Weight Constraints
Like standard opinion dynamics models, we have the fol-
lowing condition on influence weights:
∀i : |w0ii|+ |wii|+
∑
j 6=i
|wij |+ |wig|+ |wib| ≤ 1
A standard assumption for guaranteeing convergence is
|wii|+
∑
j 6=i
|wij | < 1
Since we would have weights attributed to influences ex-
ternal to the network (influences due to bias (w0ii) and
campaigning (wig, wib)), this assumption is well suited for
our model.
33.2 Opinion Update Rule
The opinion update rule in DeGroot-Friedkin model is
∀i : vi ← w0iiv0i + wiivi +
∑
j 6=i wijvj , or equivalently,
∀i : vi ← w0iiv0i +
∑
j wijvj . Generalizing to multiphase
setting, the update rule in the pth phase is ∀i : v(p)i ←
w0iiv
(p−1)
i +
∑
j wijv
(p)
j . Taking the investments of the camps
into account, it is
∀i : v(p)i ← w0iiv(p−1)i +
∑
j
wijv
(p)
j + wigx
(p)
i − wiby(p)i
⇐⇒ v(p) ← w0◦v(p−1) +wv(p) +wg◦x(p) −wb◦y(p) (1)
The static vectors: x(p),y(p),v(p−1) (weighted by
wg,wb,w
0), are unchanged throughout a phase p,
while v(p) gets updated.
Writing it as a recursion (with iterating variable τ ):
v
(p)
〈τ〉 = wv
(p)
〈τ−1〉 +w
0 ◦ v(p−1) +wg ◦ x(p) −wb ◦ y(p)
It can be simplified as
v
(p)
〈τ〉=w
τv
(p)
〈0〉+
( τ−1∑
η=0
wη
)
(w0◦v(p−1)+wg◦x(p)−wb◦y(p))
Now v(p)〈0〉 is the opinion at the beginning of phase p, which
is v(p−1). For determining if the process reaches conver-
gence, we see the limiting value when τ →∞.
Since w is a strictly substochastic matrix (with the sum of
each of its rows strictly less than 1), its spectral radius is less
than 1. So limτ→∞wτ = 0, and
∑∞
η=0w
η = (I−w)−1 [2].
Hence as τ →∞, the above equation can be written as
lim
τ→∞
v
(p)
〈τ〉 = (I−w)−1(w0 ◦ v(p−1) +wg ◦ x(p) −wb ◦ y(p))
which is a constant vector. So the dynamics in phase p
converges to the steady state
v(p) = (I−w)−1(w0 ◦ v(p−1) +wg ◦ x(p) −wb ◦ y(p)) (2)
4 PROBLEM FORMULATION
We now formulate the multi-phase objective function, and
analyze the two-phase opinion dynamics in further detail.
We first derive an expression for
∑
i v
(p)
i , the sum of the
opinion values of the nodes in the network at the end of
phase p.
Premultiplying (2) by 1T gives
1Tv(p) = 1T (I−w)−1(w0 ◦ v(p−1) +wg ◦ x(p) −wb ◦ y(p))
Let r = (I−wT )−11 = ((I−w)−1)T1 = (1T (I−w)−1)T .
So the above is equivalent to∑
i
v
(p)
i =
∑
i
riw
0
iiv
(p−1)
i +
∑
i
ri(wigx
(p)
i − wiby(p)i ) (3)
Premultiplying (2) by (r ◦w0)T gives
(r◦w0)Tv(p)=(r◦w0)T (I−w)−1(w0◦v(p−1)+wg◦x(p)−wb◦y(p))
Let the constant (r ◦ w0)T(I − w)−1 =(
(I−wT )−1(r◦w0))T = sT . So the above is equivalent
to
∑
i
riw
0
iiv
(p)
i =
∑
i
siw
0
iiv
(p−1)
i +
∑
i
si(wigx
(p)
i − wiby(p)i )
or equivalently,∑
i
riw
0
iiv
(p−1)
i =
∑
i
siw
0
iiv
(p−2)
i +
∑
i
si(wigx
(p−1)
i − wiby(p−1)i )
Substituting this in (3) gives∑
i
v
(p)
i =
∑
i
siw
0
iiv
(p−2)
i +
∑
i
si(wigx
(p−1)
i − wiby(p−1)i )
+
∑
i
ri(wigx
(p)
i − wiby(p)i ) (4)
Note that s can be viewed as a weighted extension of r. If
(I−w)−1 = ∆, then ri =
∑
j ∆ji and si =
∑
j rjw
0
jj∆ji.
Multiphase Katz centrality. ri =
(
(I−wT )−11)
i
re-
sembles Katz centrality of node i, capturing its influencing
power on other nodes if there are no subsequent phases.
However, while selecting optimal nodes for a phase if there
are subsequent phases to follow, the effectiveness of node
i depends on its influencing power over those nodes (j),
which would give good weightage (w0jj) to their initial
opinion in the next phase, as well as have a good influencing
power over other nodes (rj). This is captured by si, so it
can be viewed as two-phase Katz centrality. Let vector r
be denoted by r(1) and s by r(2). In general, for an integer
q > 1, let r(q)i =
∑
j r
(q−1)
j w
0
jj∆ji or r
(q) = ∆T (r(q−1)◦w0).
Intuitively, r(q)i is the measure of influence of node i looking
q phases ahead; it can be viewed as q-phase Katz central-
ity.
Now the recursion in Equation (4) can be simplified as∑
i
v
(p)
i =
∑
i
r
(2)
i w
0
iiv
(p−2)
i +
∑
i
r
(2)
i (wigx
(p−1)
i − wiby(p−1)i )
+
∑
i
r
(1)
i (wigx
(p)
i − wiby(p)i )
Solving the above recursion to eliminate v(p−2)i gives
∑
i
v
(p)
i =
∑
i
r
(p)
i w
0
iiv
0
i +
p∑
q=1
∑
i
r
(p−q+1)
i (wigx
(q)
i − wiby(q)i ) (5)
which is now a function of intrinsic constants and strategies.
If there is only a single phase, we have
∑
i
v
(1)
i =
∑
i
riw
0
iiv
0
i +
∑
i
riwigx
(1)
i −
∑
i
riwiby
(1)
i (6)
We focus on the two-phase campaign in our study.∑
i
v
(2)
i =
∑
i
siw
0
iiv
0
i +
∑
i
siwigx
(1)
i −
∑
i
siwiby
(1)
i
+
∑
i
riwigx
(2)
i −
∑
i
riwiby
(2)
i (7)
Here (x(1),x(2)) is the strategy of good camp, and
(y(1),y(2)) is the strategy of bad camp. Given an in-
vestment strategy profile
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
, let
ug
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
be the good camp’s utility and
ub
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
be the bad camp’s utility. The
good camp aims to maximize the value of (7), while the bad
camp aims to minimize it. So,
4ug
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
=
∑
i
v
(2)
i
and ub
(
(x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))
)
= −
∑
i
v
(2)
i (8)
with the following constraints on the investment strategies:∑
i
(
x
(1)
i + x
(2)
i
) ≤ kg , ∑
i
(
y
(1)
i + y
(2)
i
) ≤ kb
∀i : x(1)i , x(2)i , y(1)i , y(2)i ≥ 0
The game can thus be viewed as a two-player zero-sum
game, where the players determine their investment strate-
gies (x(1),x(2)) and (y(1),y(2)); the good camp invests as
per x(1) in the first phase and as per x(2) in the second
phase, and the bad camp invests as per y(1) in the first
phase and as per y(2) in the second phase. Our objective
essentially is to find the Nash equilibrium strategies of the
two camps.
5 MULTIPHASE STRATEGIES
We call a camp farsighted if it computes its strategy consid-
ering that there would be a second phase, that is, it considers
the objective function
∑
i v
(2)
i in Equation (7). A camp can
be called myopic if it computes its strategy greedily by
considering the near-sighted objective function
∑
i v
(1)
i . We
now consider cases where both camps are farsighted or
myopic, and where one camp is farsighted while the other
is myopic.
When both camps are farsighted, the game is as per (8).
Here, the optimal strategy of the good camp is to invest
the entire budget on node i with the maximum value of
max {siwig, riwig} if this value is positive (no investment
is made if this value is non-positive). If maxi siwig >
maxj rjwjg , the entire budget is invested in the first phase,
while if maxi siwig < maxj rjwjg , the entire budget is in-
vested in the second phase (indifferent between the phases if
maxi siwig = maxj rjwjg). The optimal strategy of the bad
camp is analogous. Furthermore, the optimal strategies of
the camps are mutually independent, since the optimization
terms with respect to different variables are decoupled.
When one camp (say the bad camp) is myopic, while the
other camp (say the good camp) is farsighted, the optimal
strategy of the good camp is the same as above since it is
independent of the strategy of the bad camp. Though the
actual utility of the bad camp is −∑i v(2)i , it perceives its
utility as −∑i v(1)i (see Equation (6)), owing to its myopic
nature. The optimal strategy of the bad camp is hence to
invest the entire budget on node i with the maximum value
of riwib in the first phase itself (if positive). The loss to the
bad camp owing to its myopic play is thus,
kb
(
max
i
(max {siwib, riwib, 0})−max {siˆwiˆb, 0}
)
where iˆ = arg maxi riwib.
Note that when both camps are myopic, their strategies
are as per the single phase objective function (6), that is,
the good camp invests entirely on a node i with the highest
value of riwig (if positive) and the bad camp invests entirely
on a node i with the highest value of riwib (if positive) in
the first phase. However, the actual utility would be as per
the two phase objective function (7) with x(2)i = y
(2)
i = 0,∀i.
Case of Bounded Investment per Node. Here we con-
sider the case when there is a bound on investment on every
node in either phase, for instance, 0 ≤ x(1)i , x(2)i , y(1)i , y(2)i ≤
1,∀i. Such bounded investments could be owing to dis-
counts which cannot exceed 100%, attention capacity or
time constraint of a voter to receive convincing arguments,
company policy to limit the number of free samples that
can be given to a customer, government policy of limit-
ing the monetary investment by a camp on a voter, etc.
Bounded investments would ensure that the opinion values
are bounded (from Equation (2)). Bounded opinion values
can be associated with voting in elections and product
adoption, where a bounded value could be transformed into
a probability of voting for a party or adopting a product.
For instance, an opinion value of v could imply that the
probability of voting for the good camp (or adopting the
good camp’s product) is (1 + v)/2 and that of voting for the
bad camp is (1 − v)/2. The sum of opinion values would
thus imply the expected number of votes in the favor of the
good camp.
When both camps are farsighted, for computing optimal
strategy of the good camp, we consider the set of elements
{siwig, riwig}i∈N . Until the budget kg is exhausted, we
choose an element with the maximum value one at a time,
which is not already chosen. If the chosen element is sjwjg ,
we invest on node j in the first phase, while if the chosen
element is rjwjg , we invest on node j in the second phase,
subject to a maximum investment of 1 unit. The strategy
of the bad camp is analogous. Note again that the optimal
strategies of the camps are mutually independent.
The scenario of one camp (say the bad camp) being
myopic can be analyzed on similar lines as in the case of
no bounds on investment per node, with the exception that
instead of the bad camp investing entirely in one node with
the highest value of riwib in the first phase, it would invest
on nodes according to decreasing values of riwib, subject to
a maximum investment of 1 unit per node. Hence the loss
to the bad camp can be determined. The scenario of both
camps being myopic can also be analyzed analogously.
Remark 1. When there were no bounds on investment per node,
it was optimal for a farsighted camp to invest its entire budget on
one node in one phase. The case with the bounds on investment
per node requires a farsighted camp to invest on different nodes,
possibly in different phases. Such a strategy would result in an
outcome in which the camps could split their budget across the
two phases. Specifically, the budget allocated by the good camp
for the first and second phases would be
∑
i x
(1)
i and
∑
i x
(2)
i
respectively, while that allocated by the bad camp would be∑
i y
(1)
i and
∑
i y
(2)
i .
Extension to Multiple Elections Setting. The multi-
phase study can be directly extended to the multiple elec-
tions setting, where the outcome of the first election is in
itself valuable. If the immediate outcome holds a weightage
of δ1 and the future outcome holds a weightage of δ2, the
objective function now transforms into
∑
i(δ1v
(1) + δ2v
(2)).
The decision parameter si would then get replaced by
δ1ri + δ2si.
56 DEPENDENCY OF wg AND wb ON INITIAL BIAS
So far, we considered a setting where wig and wib for a node
i, could be any fixed values. However, in several scenarios,
more often that not, the initial opinion of a node would
impact the effectiveness of the investment made by the two
camps. For example, in an election setting, if the initial
opinion of a node is highly positive, it is likely to be the case
that the investment made by the good camp would be more
effective than that made by the bad camp. In other words,
such a node is likely to be more easily influenced by (or is
more sensitive towards) the investment made by the good
camp. That is, v(p−1)i > 0 would likely mean w
(p)
ig > w
(p)
ib .
The fundamental reasoning is similar to that of the bounded
confidence model [19], where a node pays more attention to
opinions that do not differ too much from its own opinion.
Note also that w0ii would also play a role, since it says
how much weightage is given by node i to its initial
opinion. So a theoretical model can be proposed on this
line, wherein w(p)ig is a monotone non-decreasing function of
w0iiv
(p−1)
i , and w
(p)
ib is a monotone non-increasing function
of w0iiv
(p−1)
i . Let node i attribute a total of θi to the influence
weights of the camps (that is, w(p)ig +w
(p)
ib = θi), and Θ be the
vector consisting of elements θi. So one such simple linear
model could be
w
(p)
ig = θi
(
1 + w0iiv
(p−1)
i
2
)
, w(p)ib = θi
(
1− w0iiv(p−1)i
2
)
(9)
The dependency of wig and wib on the initial opinion is
particularly significant in multi-phase campaigning, since
the initial opinion changes across phases, and hence the
assumption of wig and wib being the same across phases,
may not be valid (since these values now depend on v(p−1)i
which would in general be different for different phases).
Considering that wig and wib can be different across phases,
Equation (5) can be generalized to∑
i
v
(p)
i =
∑
i
r
(p)
i w
0
iiv
0
i +
p∑
q=1
∑
i
r
(p−q+1)
i (w
(q)
ig x
(q)
i − w(q)ib y(q)i )
We now focus on two-phase campaign (p = 2). Recall that
∆ = (I − w)−1. We now derive the objective function∑
i v
(2)
i .∑
j
v
(2)
j =
∑
j
rj(w
0
jjv
(1)
j + w
(2)
jg x
(2)
j − w(2)jb y(2)j )
=
∑
j
rj
(
w0jjv
(1)
j +
θj
2
(1 + w0jjv
(1)
j )x
(2)
j −
θj
2
(1− w0jjv(1)j )y(2)j
)
=
∑
j
rjw
0
jjv
(1)
j
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
)
+
∑
j
rj
θj
2
(x
(2)
j − y(2)j )
The first term
∑
j rjw
0
jjv
(1)
j
(
1 +
θj
2 x
(2)
j +
θj
2 y
(2)
j
)
can be
obtained (without v(1)j ) by premultiplying (2) by (r ◦ w0 ◦
(1+ Θ2 ◦ x(2) + Θ2 ◦ y(2)))T and using (9). Hence we get∑
i
v
(2)
i =
∑
i
∑
j
(
w0iiv
0
i
(
1 +
θi
2
x
(1)
i +
θi
2
y
(1)
i
)
+
θi
2
(x
(1)
i − y(1)i )
)
(
rjw
0
jj∆ji
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j +
θj
2
y
(2)
j
))
+
∑
j
rj
θj
2
(x
(2)
j − y(2)j )
(10)
Note that unlike the previous setting (Equation (7)), the
optimal strategies of the two camps in this setting would
be mutually dependent in general, since the optimization
terms with respect to different variables are coupled.
6.1 The Case of a Single Camp
First we consider a simplified yet interesting version by
considering only one camp (the good camp). Here we would
have y(1)i = y
(2)
i = 0,∀i in Expression (10). For simplicity of
notation, denote rjw0jj∆ji = bji and w
0
iiv
0
i = ci. So we have∑
i
v
(2)
i =
∑
i
∑
j
(
ci+
θi
2
x
(1)
i (ci+1)
)(
bji
(
1+
θj
2
x
(2)
j
))
+
∑
j
rj
θj
2
x
(2)
j (11)
=
∑
i
x
(1)
i
(
θi
2
(ci+1)
∑
j
bji
(
1+
θj
2
x
(2)
j
))
+
∑
i
∑
j
cibji
(
1 +
θj
2
x
(2)
j
)
+
∑
j
rj
θj
2
x
(2)
j (12)
=
∑
j
x
(2)
j
(
θj
2
∑
i
bji
(
ci +
θi
2
x
(1)
i (ci + 1)
)
+
θj
2
rj
)
+
∑
i
∑
j
bji
(
ci +
θi
2
x
(1)
i (ci + 1)
)
(13)
Deducing from Equations (12) and (13) that the above ob-
jective function is a bilinear function in x(1) and x(2), we
prove the following claim.
Lemma 1. It is optimal to exhaust the entire budget (k(1)g +
k
(2)
g = kg), and if not, it is optimal to not invest at all (k
(1)
g =
k
(2)
g = 0). Furthermore, it is an optimal strategy to invest on at
most one node in a given phase.
Proof. Given any x(2), Expression (12) can be maximized
with respect to x(1) by allocating kg −
∑
j x
(2)
j to a single
node i that maximizes θi2 (ci + 1)
∑
j bji
(
1 +
θj
2 x
(2)
j
)
, if this
value is positive. In case of multiple such nodes, one node
can be chosen at random. If this value is non-positive for all
the nodes, it is optimal to have x(1) = 0. When x(1) = 0,
Expression (13) now implies that it is optimal to allocate the
entire budget kg in the second phase to a single node j that
maximizes θj2 (
∑
i bjici + rj), if this value is positive. If this
value is non-positive for all the nodes, it is optimal to have
x(2) = 0. This is the case where starting with an x(2), we
arrive at the conclusion that it is optimal to either invest
kg −
∑
j x
(2)
j on a single node in the first phase, or invest
the entire budget kg on a single node in the second phase,
or invest in neither of the phases.
Similarly using (13), starting with a given x(1), we can
conclude that it is optimal to either invest kg −
∑
j x
(1)
j on a
single node in the second phase, or invest the entire kg on a
single node in the first phase, or invest in neither phase.
So starting from any x(1) or x(2), we can iteratively im-
prove (need not be strictly) on the value of (11) by investing
on at most one node in a given phase. Furthermore, it is sub-
optimal to have k(1)g + k
(2)
g < kg unless k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0.
So there exist optimal vectors x(1) and x(2) that maxi-
mize (11), such that x(1)α = k
(1)
g , x
(2)
β = k
(2)
g , x
(1)
i 6=α = x
(2)
j 6=β =
60. Now the next step is to find the nodes α and β that
maximize (11). By incorporating α and β, the expression
for
∑
i v
(2)
i can be rewritten as∑
i 6=α
∑
j 6=β
cibji+
(
cα+
θα
2
k(1)g (cα+1)
)(
bβα
(
1+
θβ
2
k(2)g
))
+rβ
θβ
2
k(2)g
+
∑
j 6=β
bjα
(
cα +
θα
2
k(1)g (cα + 1)
)
+
∑
i6=α
ci
(
bβi
(
1 +
θβ
2
k(2)g
))
=
∑
i
∑
j
cibji +
θα
2
k(1)g
∑
j
bjα(cα + 1) +
θβ
2
k(2)g
(∑
i
bβici + rβ
)
+
θαθβ
4
k(1)g k
(2)
g bβα(cα + 1) (14)
Now, for a given pair (α, β), we will find the optimal
values of k(1)g and k
(2)
g from (14). By definition, we have
k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g . So the expression to be maximized is
∑
i
∑
j
cibji + k
(1)
g
θα
2
∑
j
bjα(cα+1) + (kg−k(1)g )θβ
2
(∑
i
bβici+rβ
)
+k(1)g (kg − k(1)g )θαθβ
4
bβα(cα + 1)
Equating the first derivative of the above expression with
respect to k(1)g to zero, we get
k(1)g =
kg
2
+
∑
j bjα
θβbβα
−
∑
i bβici + rβ
θαbβα(cα + 1)
A valid value of k(1)g can be obtained only if the denomi-
nators in the above expression are non-zero. However, note
that a zero denominator would mean that Expression (14)
is linear, resulting in only two possibilities of k(1)g , namely,
0 or kg . Also, if the second derivative with respect to k
(1)
g
is positive, that is, −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(w0ααv0α + 1) > 0, the
optimal k(1)g could be either 0 or kg .
If the second derivative with respect to k(1)g is negative,
that is,−θαθβbβα(cα+1) = −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(w0ααv0α+1) <
0, and since k(1)g is bounded between 0 and kg , the optimal
k
(1)
g for a given pair (α, β) is (since bji = rjw0jj∆ji, ci =
w0iiv
0
i ),
min
{
max
{
kg
2
+
sα
θβrβw0ββ∆βα
− 1 + w
0
ββ
∑
i ∆βiw
0
iiv
0
i
θαw0ββ∆βα(1+w
0
ααv0α)
, 0
}
, kg
}
(15)
and the corresponding optimal value of k(2)g is
min
{
max
{
kg
2
− sα
θβrβw0ββ∆βα
+
1 + w0ββ
∑
i ∆βiw
0
iiv
0
i
θαw0ββ∆βα(1+w
0
ααv0α)
, 0
}
, kg
}
(16)
When we assumed k(1)g and k
(2)
g to be fixed, we had to
iterate through all (α, β) pairs to determine the one that
gives the optimal value of Expression (14). Now, whenever
we look at an (α, β) pair, we can determine the correspond-
ing optimal values of k(1)g and k
(2)
g using (15) and (16), and
hence determine the value of Expression (14) by plugging in
the optimal k(1)g and k
(2)
g and that (α, β) pair. The optimal
pair (α, β) can thus be obtained as the pair that maximizes
(14).
The above analysis holds when k(1)g + k
(2)
g = kg . From
Lemma 1, we need to consider one more possibility that
k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0, which gives a constant value
∑
i
∑
j cibji
for Expression (14). Let (0, 0) correspond to this additional
possibility. It is hence optimal to invest k(1)g (obtained using
(15)) on node α in the first phase and k(2)g (obtained using
(16)) on node β in the second phase, subject to it giving a
value greater than
∑
i
∑
j cibji to Expression (14).
Since we iterate through (n2 + 1) possibilities (namely,
(α, β) ∈ N × N ∪ {(0, 0)}), the above procedure gives
a polynomial time algorithm for determining the optimal
budget split and the optimal investments on nodes in two
phases.
Remark 2. Expression (15) indicates that for a given (α, β) pair,
the good camp would want to invest more in the first phase for a
higher sα. This is intuitive from our understanding of sα being
viewed as the Katz centrality of node α looking two phases ahead.
Similarly, Expression (16) indicates that it would want to invest
more in the second phase for a higher rβ , since rβ can be viewed as
the Katz centrality of node β looking just one phase ahead. Also as
per (9), wig is an increasing function of θi. Now taking cue from
Expression (7), a node with a higher wig is likely to be invested on
more by the good camp. A similar insight is given by Expressions
(15) and (16), where a higher θα drives the camp to invest in the
first phase and a higher θβ drives it to invest in the second phase.
We further attempt to illustrate the role of w0ii using simulations
in Section 7.
6.2 The Case of Competing Camps
We now analyze the dependency setting with two camps.
Similar to the proof of Lemma 1, we can show that∑
i v
(2)
i is a multilinear function, since it can be written
as a linear function in x(1),y(1),x(2),y(2) separately. The
following lemma can be hence proved on similar lines.
Lemma 2. For either camp, it is optimal to exhaust the entire
budget, and if not, it is optimal to not invest at all. Furthermore,
it is an optimal strategy to invest on at most one node in a given
phase.
Denoting rjw0jj∆ji = bji and w
0
iiv
0
i = ci as before, from
Expression (10),
∑
i v
(2)
i can be expanded as
∑
i
∑
j
cibji+
∑
j
x
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i
cibji+rj
)
+
∑
j
y
(2)
j
θj
2
(∑
i
cibji−rj
)
+
∑
i
x
(1)
i
θi
2
(1+ci)
(
si+
∑
j
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji+
∑
j
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
−
∑
i
y
(1)
i
θi
2
(1−ci)
(
si+
∑
j
x
(2)
j
θj
2
bji+
∑
j
y
(2)
j
θj
2
bji
)
(17)
From Lemma 2, there exist optimal vectors x(1),x(2) for
good camp and optimal vectors y(1),y(2) for bad camp,
such that x(1)α = k
(1)
g , x
(2)
β = k
(2)
g , y
(1)
γ = k
(1)
b , y
(2)
δ =
k
(2)
b , and x
(1)
i 6=α = x
(2)
j 6=β = y
(1)
i6=γ = y
(2)
j 6=δ = 0. Assum-
ing such profile of nodes ((α, β), (γ, δ)), we first aim to
7find ((x(1)α , x
(2)
β ), (y
(1)
γ , y
(2)
δ )), or equivalently, the optimal
((k
(1)
g , k
(2)
g ), (k
(1)
b , k
(2)
b )) corresponding to such a profile. So
by incorporating ((α, β), (γ, δ)), Expression (17) for
∑
i v
(2)
i
can be simplified as
∑
i
∑
j
cibji + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
(∑
i
cibβi + rβ
)
+ k
(2)
b
θδ
2
(∑
i
cibδi − rδ
)
+ k(1)g
θα
2
(1 + cα)
(
sα + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
bβα + k
(2)
b
θδ
2
bδα
)
− k(1)b
θγ
2
(1− cγ)
(
sγ + k
(2)
g
θβ
2
bβγ + k
(2)
b
θδ
2
bδγ
)
(18)
First, we consider the case when k(1)g + k
(2)
g = kg
and k(1)b + k
(2)
b = kb. Now, for a given profile of
nodes ((α, β), (γ, δ)), we will find the optimal values of
k
(1)
g , k
(2)
g , k
(1)
b , k
(2)
b . In this case, we have k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g
and k(2)b = kb − k(1)b . Substituting this in (18) and si-
multaneously solving ∂
∑
i v
(2)
i
∂k
(1)
g
= 0 and ∂
∑
i v
(2)
i
∂k
(1)
b
= 0,
we get k(1)g equal to (letting A = θγθδ(1 − cγ)bδγ and
B = 12 (θαθδ(1 + cα)bδα − θγθβ(1− cγ)bβγ) ):
1
B2+θαθβ(1+cα)bβαA
[
sαθα(1+cα)A−rβθβA−sγθγ(1−cγ)B+rδθδB
+kg
( θαθβ
2
(1 + cα)bβαA−
θγθβ
2
(1− cγ)bβγB
)
+kb
( θαθδ
2
(1 + cα)bδαA−
θγθδ
2
(1− cγ)bδγB
)
−θβA
∑
i
cibβi − θδB
∑
i
cibδi
]
We can similarly obtain k(1)b . If the second derivative
with respect to k(1)g , that is, −θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(1+w0ααv0α) <
0 and that with respect to k(1)b , that is, θγθδrδw
0
δδ∆δγ(1 −
w0γγv
0
γ) > 0, and the obtained solution is such that k
(1)
g ∈
[0, kg] and k
(1)
b ∈ [0, kb], then we have that neither the
good camp can change k(1)g to increase
∑
i v
(2)
i , nor the bad
camp can change k(1)b to decrease
∑
i v
(2)
i . So we can effec-
tively write ug((x(1),x(2)), (y(1),y(2))) as ug((α, β), (γ, δ)),
where ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) is the value of
∑
i v
(2)
i , which corre-
sponds to the strategy profile where the good camp invests
on nodes (α, β) with optimal budget split (k(1)g , k
(2)
g ), and
the bad camp invests on nodes (γ, δ) with optimal budget
split (k(1)b , k
(2)
b ).
For a general case where the solution k(1)g , k
(1)
b ob-
tained above may not satisfy k(1)g ∈ [0, kg] and k(1)b ∈
[0, kb], we make a practically reasonable assumption so
as to determine ug((α, β), (γ, δ)). It is easy to show that
if wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j), we would have ∆ij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and
ri ≥ 1,∀i. So if we assume that wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and
w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, v0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i, we would have that
−θαθβrβw0ββ∆βα(1 + w0ααv0α) ≤ 0 and θγθδrδw0δδ∆δγ(1 −
w0γγv
0
γ) ≥ 0. That is, we would have
∑
i v
(2)
i to be a convex-
concave function, which is concave with respect to k(1)g and
convex with respect to k(1)b . So in the domain ([0, kg], [0, kb]),
we can find a (k(1)g , k
(1)
b ) such that, neither the good camp
can change k(1)g to increase
∑
i v
(2)
i , nor the bad camp can
change k(1)b to decrease
∑
i v
(2)
i [40], [41]. So we can assign
this value
∑
i v
(2)
i to ug((α, β), (γ, δ)).
Thus using the above technique, we obtain
ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for all profiles of nodes ((α, β), (γ, δ))
in the case when k(1)g + k
(2)
g = kg and k
(1)
b + k
(2)
b = kb.
From Lemma 2, the only other cases to be considered are
k
(1)
b = k
(2)
b = 0 and k
(1)
g = k
(2)
g = 0. Let the profile of nodes
((α, β), (0, 0)) correspond to k(1)b = k
(2)
b = 0. Note that
when k(1)b = k
(2)
b = 0, it reduces to the single camp case
with only the good camp (Section 6.1). The value of
∑
i v
(2)
i
for an (α, β) pair can hence be assigned to ug((α, β), (0, 0)).
Thus we can obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for all profiles of nodes
((α, β), (0, 0)). Similarly, we can obtain ug((α, β), (γ, δ)) for
all profiles of nodes ((0, 0), (γ, δ)). And from Equation (18),
we know that ug((0, 0), (0, 0)) =
∑
i
∑
j cibji.
So we have that the good camp has (n2+1) possible pure
strategies to choose from, namely, (α, β) ∈ N×N ∪{(0, 0)}.
Similarly, the bad camp has (n2 +1) possible pure strategies
to choose from, namely, (γ, δ) ∈ N ×N ∪ {(0, 0)}. We thus
have a two-player zero-sum game, for which the utilities
of the players can be computed for each strategy profile
((α, β), (γ, δ)) as explained above. Though we cannot en-
sure the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, the
finiteness of the number of strategies ensures the existence
of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, owing
to it being a two-player zero-sum game, the Nash equilibria
can be found efficiently using linear programming [42].
Summarizing, under practically reasonable assumptions
(wij ≥ 0,∀(i, j) and w0ii ≥ 0, θi ≥ 0, v0i ∈ [−1, 1],∀i),
we transformed the problem into a two-player zero-sum
game with each player having (n2 + 1) pure strategies,
and showed how the players’ utilities can be computed for
each strategy profile. We thus deduced the existence of Nash
equilibria and that they can be found efficiently using linear
programming.
7 SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
For determining implications of our analytically derived
results on real-world networks, we conducted a simula-
tion study on a popular network dataset: NetHEPT (a co-
authorship network in the “High Energy Physics - Theory”
papers on the e-print arXiv from 1991 to 2003), consisting
of 15,233 nodes and 31,376 edges. This network exhibits
many structural features of large-scale social networks and
is widely used for experimental justifications, for example,
in [21], [43], [44].
In our simulations, we consider v0i = 0,∀i. We transform
the original undirected network into a directed one by mak-
ing all edges bidirectional. Let N(i) be the set of neighbors
of node i in the network. For a fixed w0ii, we consider
wig, wib > 0 and wij ≥ 0,∀j ∈ N(i) such that the weights
for any node i sum to 1, that is, wig + wib +
∑
j∈N(i) wij =
1 − w0ii. Furthermore, for different values of w0ii, the values
of wig, wib, wij are scaled proportional to 1 − w0ii. That is,
the values wˆig, wˆib, wˆij corresponding to wˆ0ii and the values
w˜ig, w˜ib, w˜ij corresponding to w˜0ii, are such that
∀i : 1− wˆ
0
ii
1− w˜0ii
=
wˆig
w˜ig
=
wˆib
w˜ib
=
wˆij
w˜ij
, ∀j ∈ N(i)
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Fig. 1. Results illustrating the effects of w0ii (NetHEPT)
For the case of dependency among parameters, where
w
(q)
ig =
θi
2 (1 + w
0
iiv
(q−1)
i ) and w
(q)
ib =
θi
2 (1− w0iiv(q−1)i ),
we let θi = w˜ig + w˜ib, where w˜ig and w˜ib are as above.
Furthermore, since we assume v0i = 0, we would have
w
(1)
ig = w
(1)
ib =
θi
2 . We consider different values of w
0
ii,
namely, {0, 0.05, . . . , 0.95}. In our simulation study, we
assume that this value is same for all nodes. This allows
us to study the effect of the values of w0ii on the two phase
strategy of the camps.
Simulation Results. Figures 1 (a) and 1(c) present the
optimal amount of budget that should be invested in the
first phase as a function of w0ii for the bounded setting
(where investment on each node is bounded in either phase)
and the dependency setting (where the influence weight of
the camp on a node depends on its initial bias), respectively.
In our simulations, the optimal values obtained are such that
k
(2)
g = kg − k(1)g and k(2)b = kb − k(1)b . For low values of w0ii,
the optimal strategy of the camps is to invest almost entirely
in the second phase. This is because the effect of first phase
diminishes in second phase. The value sj =
∑
i riw
0
ii∆ij of
a node j would be significant only if it influences nodes
j with significant values of w0ii. And hence, investing in
first phase would be advantageous only if we have nodes
which have significant value of w0ii. With low values to
w0ii; we are less likely to have nodes j with high values
of sj since it requires them to not only be influential but
also influential towards significant number of nodes i with
significant values ofw0ii. This also justifies Figure 1(b) where,
if the bad camp acts myopically (spending its entire budget
in the first phase), it incurs significantly more loss for lower
values of w0ii (higher value of
∑
i v
(2)
i is worse for the bad
camp).
Though we have observed that low values of w0ii are
detrimental for the values of sj and hence for investment in
the first phase, the budget allotted to the first phase need not
be a monotone function of w0ii. It is possible that for a value
of w0ii, a set of nodes have good values of sj =
∑
i riw
0
ii∆ij
and hence are worth investing on in the first phase. How-
ever for a higher range of w0ii, the values of wig, wib, wij
scale down, and hence the first phase worth of a node j
(sjwjg or sjwjb) may be superseded by the second phase
worth of some other node j′ (rj′wj′g or rj′wj′b), thus possi-
bly making it advantageous to invest in the second phase for
a higher w0ii. In Figure 1(a), for the setting where the values
of wig and wib do not depend on the initial opinion of node
i (when we consider bounded investment per node), the
general observations suggest that a high range of w0ii makes
it advantageous for the camps to invest in the first phase,
albeit in a non-monotone way owing to the aforementioned
reason. In Figure 1(c), for the dependency setting with single
camp (where we consider unbounded investment per node),
a high range of w0ii makes it advantageous for the camps
to invest in the first phase. Here we point that though we
presented a polynomial time algorithm for the dependency
setting with two camps, which is of theoretical interest, it is
computationally expensive to run on networks larger than a
few hundred nodes.
8 CONCLUSION
Using DeGroot-Friedkin model of opinion dynamics, we
proposed a framework for optimal multiphase investment
strategies for two competing camps in a social network. We
focused on two phases and derived closed-form expressions
for optimal strategies, and the extent of loss that a camp
would incur if it acted myopically against a farsighted
competitor. We then studied the setting where the influence
of the camps on a node depended on the node’s initial
bias. For the case of single camp, we derived polynomial
time algorithm for determining an optimal way of splitting
the budget between the two phases. For the case of two
camps, we showed the existence of Nash equilibria under
reasonable assumptions, and that they can be computed in
polynomial time. Our simulations quantified the impact of
the weightage that nodes attribute to their initial biases.
Notably, higher weightage would necessitate more invest-
ment in the first phase, so as to influence these biases for the
second (terminal) phase.
As future direction, it would be interesting to study op-
timal multiphase investment strategies under other models
of opinion dynamics in the literature. The two camps setting
can be extended to multiple camps. Also, the two phase
study can be generalized to multiple phases to see if any
important insights or benefits can be obtained. It would
be interesting to study the problem with bounds on total
investment on a node by the two camps together (such as
∀i, xi + yi ≤ 1). It is also worth exploring the possibility of
more efficient algorithms for the dependency setting with
two camps.
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